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ABSTRACT: This article aims at identifying the factors behind the Mexican Peso 
Crisis of 1994-1995 through building a probit model incorporating 20 monthly 
macroeconomic, political, and financial sector variables from 1970:1 – 1995:1. As a 
result of the probit regressions, strong evidence emerges that the significant 
variables are political instability, foreign exchange reserves, domestic credit/GDP, 
lending and deposit rate spread, national savings, and foreign direct 
investment/GDP. Evidence further indicates that the signs of the variables are 
mostly in line with our expectations, with the exception of inflation, bank 
reserves/bank assets, export growth, and lending and deposit rate spread. 
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ÖZET: Bu makale 1994-1995 Meksika Pezo Krizi’nin ardındaki faktörleri aylık 20 
makroekonomik, siyasi ve finans sektörü değişkenleriyle oluşturulan bir probit 
modeli kullanarak tespit etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Probit regresyonunun neticesinde 
anlamlı değişkenler olarak siyasi istikrarsızlık, döviz rezervleri, yerel kredi/GSMH, 
borç ve mevduat oranı arasındaki fark, ulusal tasarruflar ve doğrudan yabancı 
yatırım/GSMH değerleri alınmıştır. Bulgular, değişkenlerin, enflasyon, banka 
rezervleri/banka aktifleri, ihracat büyüme oranı ve borç ve mevduat oranı 
arasındaki fark haricinde beklenildiği şekilde ortaya çıktığını göstermektedir. 
 
Anahtar kelimeler: Meksika Pezo krizi, finansal krizler, probit modeli. 
 
1. Introduction 
Mexico experienced recurring financial crises in 1976, 1982, 1986 and, 1994-1995 
with devastating economic and social consequences. The most recent crisis that 
emerged in December 1994 was the worst with the peso losing 40% of its value. 
Prior to the crisis, Mexico had a crawling peg exchange rate system. The peso-US 
dollar exchange rate was kept within a narrow target band, but the upper limit of the 
band was raised slightly every day by a predetermined amount, allowing for a 
gradual nominal depreciation of the peso. However, in reality the peso was 
appreciating leading to a current account deficit. The band floor was fixed at 3.051 
Mexican pesos per US dollar. The band ceiling had been allowed to increase 0.004 
pesos a day and any increase of the peso – US dollar exchange rate beyond this 
threshold in one day would force the Mexican central bank to intervene and defend 
the parity. In December 1994, the Mexican government decided to devalue the peso 
by 15 percent, to about four pesos per dollar and within a few days the peso 
plummeted, sinking the country into a financial crisis which led to a 9.2% fall in real 
GNP per capita, loss of 2 million jobs, and 21% fall in the average manufacturing 
wages as well as to a stock market crash. The crisis, however, was handled relatively 
quickly due to the prompt response of the United States and the IMF in providing a 
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$50 billion line of credit. Mexico, in return, put up its oil revenues as collateral. 
After a tough recession in 1995, Mexico began to recover strongly from the crisis. 
The rescue package restored investor confidence and stopped the massive capital 
outflows.  
 
The theoretical literature on financial crises is categorized into three mainstream 
models, namely first-generation models, second-generation models, and third-
generation models. In the "first-generation" models (Krugman 1979; Flood and 
Garber 1984), a government with persistent money-financed budget deficits is 
assumed to use a limited stock of reserves to peg its exchange rate and the attempts 
of investors to anticipate the inevitable collapse generates a speculative attack on the 
currency when reserves fall to some critical level. In the "second-generation" models 
(Obstfeld 1994, 1996, Ozkan and Sutherland 1995, Radelet and Sachs 1998) policy 
is less mechanical: a government chooses whether or not to defend a pegged 
exchange rate by making a tradeoff between short-run macroeconomic flexibility 
and longer-term credibility. The crisis then arises from the fact that defending the 
parity is more expensive as it requires higher interest rates. Should the market 
believe that defense will ultimately fail, a speculative attack on a currency develops 
either as a result of a predicted future deterioration in macro fundamentals, or purely 
through self-fulfilling prediction. The need for the third generation models became 
apparent in 1990s with Mexican Tequila crisis of 1994 and the East Asian crisis of 
1997. A number of new approaches have emerged to explain how these crises 
evolved and how they spread from country to country. Third-generation models 
(Dooley 1997, Krugman 1998, Radelet and Sachs 1998) are categorized into three 
different groups such as herd-behavior, contagion, and moral hazard. There have 
been numerous empirical studies such as Frankel and Rose (1996), Sachs et al. 
(1996), Kaminsky et al. (1998), Berg and Pattillo (1999) Komulainen and Lukkarila 
(2003), and Feridun (2004a, 2004b. 2004c, 2005a in the literature on financial 
crises. It is beyond the scope of the present study to review the existing literature in 
detail. Interested readers may refer to Feridun 2005b for a detailed review of the 
literature. 
 
This article aims at identifying the variables that account for the Mexican financial 
crisis based on a probit model set up using 20 indicators. This article is structured as 
follows: Section 1 presents the data and methodology. Section 2 points out the 
findings of the research. The last section points out the conclusions that emerge from 
the study. 
  
2. Data and Methodology  
The probit model is built based on monthly observations spanning the period 
between 1970:1 and 1995:1. Most data are gathered from DataStream. The data for 
government debt figures come from several sources, including IFS, the World 
Bank’s WDI and IMF country reports. The tested 20 indicators are selected on the 
basis of currency crisis theories and previous empirical literature, and are 
transformed into log returns to achieve mean reverting properties and to make 
statistical testing procedures valid. In addition to the traditional macroeconomic 
variables, we include several indicators describing the vulnerability of domestic 
banks. These indicators include the growth of bank deposits, the ratio of the lending 
rate to the deposit rate, and the ratio of bank reserves to assets. We also employ 
variables that indicate vulnerability to a sudden stop of capital inflows. These 
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variables are public debt, M2/ foreign exchange reserves, and private sector 
liabilities. We also include an index that proxies the political instability. To study 
foreign influences on crises, we include the US interest rate. Since we study all these 
variables simultaneously, we hope to distinguish those indicators that reflect actual 
causes of the recent crises in Mexico. Table 1 shows the explanatory variables. 
 
Table 1. Explanatory Variables 
Indicator & 
Expected Sign 
 
Explanation 
 
Inflation + 
Inflation is associated with high nominal interest rates and may proxy 
macroeconomic mismanagement that adversely affects the economy 
and the banking system (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache 1997). 
Real 
Exchange 
Rate 
- 
Currency overvaluation may lead to deteriorations in the current 
account and have historically been associated with currency crises 
(Berg et al. 1999). 
Export 
Growth - 
Weak exports may lead to deteriorations in the current account and 
have often been associated with currency crises (Dowling and 
Zhuang, 2000). 
Import 
Growth + 
Excessive import growth could lead to worsening in the current 
account and have been related with currency crises (Berg and Patillo 
1999) 
M1 + 
Growth of M1 indicates excess liquidity, which may invoke 
speculative attacks on the currency thus leading to a currency crisis 
(Eichengreen et al. 1995).  
Domestic 
Credit/GDP + 
High levels of domestic credit indicate the fragility of a banking 
system (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1998). 
Stock Prices - Recessions and a burst in asset price bubbles often precede currency crises (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). 
Public 
Debt/GDP + 
Higher indebtedness is expected to raise vulnerability to a reversal in 
capital inflows, and hence to raise the probability of a crisis (Lanoie 
and Lemarbre, 1996). 
Foreign direct 
investment/G
DP 
+ 
Shows net inflows in the reporting economy. East Asian countries had 
been dependent on net capital inflows over the decade preceding the 
crisis 
US Interest 
rates + 
International interest rate increases are often associated with capital 
outflows (Edison, 2003) 
Bank 
Reserves/Bank 
Assets 
- 
Shows the liquidity of the banking system. Adverse macroeconomic 
shocks are less likely to lead to crises in countries where the banking 
system is liquid (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1997). 
Lending Rate-
Deposit Rate + 
An increase of this indicator reflects a deterioration in credit risk as 
banks are unwilling to lend or decline in loan equity (Kaminsky et al. 
1998) 
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Real interest 
rate + 
Used as a proxy of financial liberalization. Liberalization process 
itself tends to lead to high real rates. High real interest rates have been 
increased to repel a speculative attack (Kaminsky et al. 1998). 
Foreign 
exchange 
reserves 
- 
Most currency collapses are preceded by a period of increased efforts 
to defend the exchange rate, which are market by declining foreign 
exchange reserves (Kaminsky et al. 1998). 
Current 
Account/GDP - 
An increase in the current account is associated with large capital 
inflows which indicate a diminished probability to devalue and thus to 
lower the probability of a crisis (Berg and Patillo 1999). 
M2/Foreign 
Exchange 
reserves 
+ 
Indicates to what extent the liabilities of the banking system are 
backed by foreign reserves. It also captures the ability of the central 
bank to meet sudden domestic foreign exchange demands (Berg and 
Patillo 1999). 
Fiscal 
Balance/GDP + 
Higher fiscal deficits are expected to raise the probability of crisis 
since they increase the vulnerability to shocks and investor’s 
confidence (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1997). 
Political 
Instability + 
Frequent change in the political regime may reduce the willingness of 
the international financial community to provide financing for a 
current account deficit. Moreover, political instability may lead to 
larger budget and current account deficits. 
GDP per 
capita - 
Deterioration of the domestic economic activity is expected to 
increase the likelihood of crises (Lanoie and Lemarbre 1996). 
National 
Saving 
Growth 
- High national savings may be expected to lower the probability of debt rescheduling (Lanoie and Lemarbre 1996). 
 
Given the aforementioned indicators, the model estimates the probability for 
financial crises. The estimated model takes the form: 
 
Prob (yit = 1│xt , βt) = F(xt , βt) (1) 
 
where xt corresponds to our set of indicators and βt is a vector of unknown 
parameters. The observed variable yit receives a value of 0 or 1 depending on 
whether a crisis has occurred or not. With a probit model, the right-hand side of the 
model is constrained between 0 and 1, and is compared to the observed value yit. 
The probit model assumes that the probability distribution function (yit conditional 
on xit) corresponds to normal distribution. Since in currency crisis situations a 
successful attack leads to sharp currency depreciation and substantial reserve losses, 
both the signal approach and limited dependent models traditionally define a 
currency crisis as a discrete event. One common technique is to construct an index 
of exchange market pressure as a weighted average of exchange rate changes and 
reserves changes (as well as interest rates in some cases). The crisis is said to occur 
when the index exceeds a particular threshold level. At this point, we calculate an 
exchange market pressure index (EMP) for each country. The index includes 
exchange rate depreciation and loss of reserves, which are weighted to influence 
equally. The exchange market pressure index takes the form: 
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EMP = ∆e – (σe/σr)*∆r (2) 
 
where ∆e denotes the change in exchange rate and ∆r in international reserves, σe 
and σr denote the standard deviation of exchange rate alteration and reserves, 
respectively. We determine the values of the EMP index more than two standard 
deviations above the mean as a crisis. Since macroeconomic variables often worsen 
prior to the actual crash, we define not only the crisis month but also the preceding 
eleven months as a crisis. In other words, we use a one-year window for our 
variables.  
 
3. Empirical Results 
As Table 2 indicates, the signs of the variables are mostly in line with our 
expectations, with the exception of inflation, bank reserves / bank assets ratio, 
export growth, and lending and deposit rate spread. The significant variables are 
political instability, foreign exchange reserves, domestic credit / GDP, lending and 
deposit rate spread, national savings, and foreign direct investment / GDP. Table 3 
summarizes the results of the study. 
 
Table 2. Probit Model 
Variable Coefficient Z-statistic Variable Coefficient Z-statistic 
Inflation -21.14572 0.726587 US interest rates 1.579576 0.789433 
Real exchange rate -14.052321 0.626598 FDI / GDP -22.54734 1.675097* 
Export growth 16.24368 0.327680 National savings -11.65876 -1.724881* 
Import growth 23.25560 0.658798 Real interest rate 3.557567 -0.49468 
M1 -33.78773 0.868798 Public debt / GDP 12.86547 0.789999 
Domestic credit / GDP -23.78677 2.854786*** Current account/GDP -22.65778 0.732654 
Stock prices -13.65477 0.766577 GDP per capita -14.66766 -0.595546 
Political Instability 12.687879 2.76577*** Fiscal balance / GDP 11.76528 0.6568767 
Lending and deposit rate 
spread -22.768987 2.885467*** 
M2 / foreign 
exchange reserves -23.65572 0.3698789 
Bank reserves / bank 
assets 1.786868 0.755436 
Foreign exchange 
reserves -26.87680 1.674280* 
* Significant at the 10% level 
** Significant at the 5% level, 
*** Significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 3. Regression Results 
 
Variable Expected Sign 
Found 
Sign Significance Variable 
Expected
Sign 
Found 
Sign Significance 
Inflation + -  US interest rates + +  
Real Exchange 
Rate - -  FDI / GDP + - * 
Export Growth - +  National savings - - * 
Import Growth + +  Real interest rate + +  
M1 + -  Public debt / GDP + +  
Domestic 
Credit/GDP + - *** 
Current 
account/GDP - -  
Stock Prices - -  GDP per capita - -  
Political 
Instability + + *** 
Fiscal balance / 
GDP + +  
Lending and 
deposit rate 
spread 
+ - *** 
M2 / foreign 
exchange 
reserves 
+ -  
Bank reserves / 
bank assets + +  
Foreign 
exchange 
reserves 
- - * 
* Significant at the 10% level. 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
*** Significant at the 1% level. 
 
4. Conclusions 
This study analyzes the causes of the Mexican peso crisis using data from 1970:1 to 
1995:1. It estimates a probit model using 20 macroeconomic, political, and financial 
sector indicators. The Results indicate that the significant variables are political 
instability, foreign exchange reserves, domestic credit/GDP, lending and deposit rate 
spread, national savings, and foreign direct investment/GDP. Evidence further 
indicates that the signs of the variables are mostly in line with our expectations, with 
the exception of inflation, bank reserves / bank assets, export growth, and lending 
and deposit rate spread. Based on this analysis, we can conclude that the Mexican 
Peso Crisis of 1994-95 was the result of a mix of microeconomic and 
macroeconomic factors. 
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